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In The Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
B & R SUPPLY COMPANY, 
Pla~ntiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
J.M. BRINGHURST and 
LEO BRINGHURST, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Case No. 
12805 
Respondent brought this action to recover the bal-
ance due on certain purchases of plumbing supplies. 
Appellants tendered payment of such sum but refused 
to pay attorney's fees incurred in the collection of the 
balance due as agreed in the invoice lists of the pur-
chases that were signed by Respondent and their em-
ployees. Respondent maintains that the employees did 
have the authority to bind the Appellants to the invoice 
agreements. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to the Court on stipulated facts. 
The District Court entered Findings of Fact and Con-
2 
clusions of Law based on the entire record. Judgment 
was entered for Respondent on the grounds that the 
employees did have the authority to bind their princi-
pals. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants seek to reverse the judgment of the 1 
lower court and to enter a judgment of no cause of 
action. 
STATE1\1ENT OF FACTS 
During the period from .May to August of 1970, ' 
Appellants herein, Leo and J. 1\1. Bringhurst, made 
various purchases from time to time of certain whole-
sale plumbing supplies from Respondent, B & R Sup-
ply Company. Approximately Five-Hundred Dollars 1 
( $500.00) worth of purchases were made directly by 
the Appellants and signed for by them. The remaining 
purchases were made by employees of the Appellants. 
The Appellants would either order the supplies by tele-
phone and have them delivered to the job site by the 
Respondent where an employee of the Appellants would 
sign for them on the invoice list, or an employee of the 
Appellants would pick the supplies up at Respondent's 
place of business and sign for them at that time. The 
Appellants admit that their employees, who were 
journeymen plumbers, had the authority to pick up and 
receive the supplies or purchase them on open account. 
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Partial payment for these supplies had been made 
prior to the commencement of suit by Respondent for 
the balance due on these purchases totaling $1,685.01. 
After suit was commenced by Respondent, the Appel-
lants tendered the full amount owing on the balance 
due. However, the Appellants refused to pay the at-
torney's fees that Respondent alleged were incurred in 
the collection of said sum. 
Respondent bases its claim to attorney's fees upon 
the terms of the purchase agreement contained in the in-
voices wherein, among other things, it is stated in small 
inconspicious print: 
". . . It is agreed that all merchandise covered 
by this invoice shall be paid for at the Seller's 
office, Salt Lake City, Utah, within 30 days 
following date hereof. Any portion of .the 
pu,rchase price not so paid shall bear interest 
at the rate of % of one percent per month both 
before and after judgment, until paid and pur-
chaser agrees to pay costs incident to collection 
of said sums, including reasonable attorney's 
fees." (pp. 9-15; Exhibits A through J of 
Record) 
Upon the above stipulated facts and documents of 
record, the District Court of the Third Judicial District 
in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, Honor-
able James S. Sawaya presiding, gave Judgment for 
Respondent in the amount of $420.61 as attorney's fees, 
plus $24.40 court costs. 
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ARGU1\1ENT 
POINT I. 
THE El\IPLOYEES OF THE APPEL-
LANTS HAD NO AUTHORITY, EXPRESS 
OR IMPLIED, TO BIND THEIR PRINCIPAL 
TO THE INVOICE AGREE1"1ENT FOR PAY-
MENT OF ATTORNEY'S FEES INCURRED 
IN COLLECTING THE PAST DUE PFR-
CHASE PRICES OF THE PLU1\1BING SUP-
PLIES. 
In Park v. 1lfoorman 1.tlfg. Co., et al., 121 U. 339. 
241 P2d 914 ( 1952), the Supreme Court of Utah, 
Justice .McDonough writing the opinion for the Court, 
stated the general rule with respect to the ability of i 
agents to perform acts incidental to their authorized 
acts from .Mecham on Agency, Section 1781: 
"Whenever the doing of a certain act or the 
transaction of a given affair or the perform-
ance of certain business is confided to an agent, 
the authority to so act will, in accordance with 
a general rule often referred to, carry with it by 
implication the authority to do all the collateral 
acts which are the natural and ordinary inci-
dents of the main acts or business authorized. 
The speaking of words-the making of state-
ments, representations, declarations, aclmis-
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sions, and the like, may easily be such an inci-
dent as the doing of any other sort of act." 
This same general principal was again expressed 
in Naujoko v. Sukrmann, 9 U.2d 84 at p. 87, 337 P2d 
967 ( 1959), as a reason for binding a principal to the 
incidental activities of its agents: 
"The defendants having selected their em-
ployee and agent, are chargeable with responsi-
bility for his activities and knowledge within 
the scope of assigned duties and those reason-
ably and necessarily incident thereto." 
Thus, the general rule of law emerging from these 
two Utah cases is that a principal is bound by the activi-
ties of his agent that are authorized by the principal or 
that are "reasonably and necessarily" or "naturally and 
ordinarily" incident to the accomplishment of the auth-
orized acts. 
The stipulated facts of this case show that there 
was no express authority given by Appellants to their 
employees to bind them to the invoice agreement. The 
Appellants only authorized their journeymen plumbers 
to pick up or receive the supplies and at "no time what-
soever authorized any of the persons who signed certain 
invoices, sales receipts, or the like of the plaintiff here-
in [Respondent], to contract on his behalf or to sign 
any documents on his behalf, other than on open ac-
counts." (Record at p. 21, Affidavit of Leo Bring-
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hurst). This express authorization to purchase supplies 
did not carry with it the power to bind their principal 
to the terms of the invoice agreement regarding attor-
ney's fees, since that provision was not "reasonably and 
necessarily" or "naturally and ordinarily" incident to 
the authorized act of purchasing supplies, picking them 
up or receiving them. In essence, the employees did not 
have the implied authority to bind their principals to the 
attorney's fee provision of the invoice agreements. 
In Louden JJJ achinery Co. v. Day, 104 Vt. 520. 
162 A 370 ( 1932) , the agent was to build a barn and 
procure all necessary materials and labor for the princi-
pal. Pursuant to this, the agent ordered from plaintiff 
a ventilating system, the purchase order signed in the 
name of the agent and which provided the purchaser 
would pay reasonable costs of collection and attorney's 
fees in case of default. The Court stated: 
" ... [The agent] had authority to build a barn 
on the defendant's premises, and to procure the 
necessary materials and labor therefor. So far 
as the plaintiff is concerned his [the agent's] 
powers extended no further than to purchase 
on defendant's credit a ventilating system and 
to fix the price to be paid. The agreed facts 
are silent as to any authority, express or im-
plied, to bind the defendant for costs and at-
torney's fees." (162 A 370 at p. 372) 
The same essential facts or lack of them are pres-
ent in this case. First, there is no express authority 
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shown to bind the principal for the acts of his employees. 
Second, there are no facts to show they had the implied 
authority to so bind their principal in a contract of pur-
chase, the invoice agreement as to attorney's fees was 
not naturally or reasonably incident to that activity. 
In Blake v. Blake, 17 U. 2d 369, 412 P2d 454 
( 1966), the Court stated the general rule that "attor-
ney's fees are not recoverable as damages in either ac-
tions on contracts or in torts if there is no statutory or 
contractual authority for such fees," citing Kidman v. 
White, 14 U.2d 142, 378 P2d 898 ( 1963) ) ; et. al. This 
shows that in contract and tort actions attorney's fee 
awards are the exception rather than the rule. They are 
not reasonable unless one of the two preceding condi-
tions are present. Thus, in order for an agent to be able 
to bind his principal to such agreements he should have 
that express power given to him by the principal since 
attorney's fees are not normally awarded to successful 
litigants absent express authority (contract or statute) 
therefor. In many instances in the present case the em-
ployees were journeymen plumbers doing labor at the 
job site and merely signed for receipt of the supplies. 
This does not create the express or implied authority 
to bind the principal to unusual damages and costs since 
these are not incidental and normal recoveries under 
contract actions; and the same argument holds true for 
the pick-up purchases by the employees at Respondent's 
place of business. 
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CONCLUSION 
Appellants' employees had no authority, express 
or implied, to bind the Appellants to the agreement in 
the invoice lists to pay for reasonable attorney's fees. 
Therefore, Judgment of the District Court should be 
reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JOHN L. McCOY 
RYBERG, McCOY & 
HALGREN 
325 South Third East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Defendants 
and Appellants 
